This paper outlines a Bayesian approach to estimating discrete games of incomplete information. The MCMC routine proposed features two changes to the traditional Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to facilitate the estimation of games. First, we propose a new approach to sample equilibrium probabilities using a probabilistic equilibrium selection rule that allows for the evaluation of the parameter posterior. Second, we propose a di¤erential evolution based MCMC sampler which is capable of handling the unwieldy posterior that only has support on the equilibrium manifold. We also present two applications to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed methodology.
Introduction
Firms and consumers make choices which are in ‡uenced by the choices made by others. In particular, the payo¤s from discrete choices that such economic agents make often depend on the choices of other agents. For example, pro…ts from entry depend on if competitors enter, a given supermarket's pricing strategy choice might depend on what its competition does. Individual choices are no di¤erent nd one can think of a plethora of examples where peer e¤ects have a signi…cant impact on our choices. 1 The estimation of discrete choice models with such strategic and social interactions is non-trivial. The key issue, is that the correspondence between parameters and the likelihood is multivalued. In other words, for any particular guess of the parameters there might exist multiple values of the choice probabilities. This gives rise to the need for a mechanism that prescribes which values are relevant for the construction of the likelihood. The researcher then has to de…ne a rule that picks from this set of probabilities to construct the sample likelihood. This in itself would not be problematic, but the current knowledge base does not have methods available that can fully characterize this equilibrium set, at least not in a cost e¤ective manner. This has turned researchers away from estimation methods that involve solving for …xed points since if we do not have a guarantee that we can …nd all equilibria any speci…cation of the equilibrium selection rule will by construction be incomplete. The models we consider in this paper are described by discrete choice likelihoods where choice probabilities are de…ned as the outcome of such …xed point computations. Usually we will know that there an equilibrium exists but in many cases there many be more than one equilibria. As we described above this multiplicity problem complicates the issue of taking the model to data.
There are a few approaches that one might take to resolving this problem. The …rst is a Nested Fixed Point approach originally proposed by Rust (1987) in the for single agent dynamic discrete choice models. In the context of games, the idea is to construct an inner loop that searches for all possible equilibria for each parameter guess and then uses a pre-determined equilibrium selection rule to construct the likelihood. The outer loop searches over the parameter space to maximize the likelihood. While the nested …xed point approach works quite well in single agent settings (because of a unique …xed point), it is often infeasible in multi-player settings where multiplicity may arise. This is because there exist 2 no analytical or computational methods available that are able to …nd all equilibria and guarantee the exact characterization of the equilibrium manifold. There have been a few papers that use the nested …xed point approach (see e.g. Seim 2006 , Singh and Zhu 2005) with either the implicit or explicit assumption that there exists only one equilibria.
An alternative, and quite popular, set of methods are based on the idea of employing a pseudo-likelihood. This idea has been popularized by the pioneering work of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) in the context of dynamic games. These authors build on the estimators …rst developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) and quantify player beliefs by estimating reduced form representation of the equilibrium probabilities (also known as the conditional choice probabilities or CCPs) directly. By recognizing that in equilibrium the probabilities will only be a function of observable state variables the researcher can in a …rst stage estimate these probabilities using ‡exible methods. In a subsequent stage these estimated probabilities are taken as given and 'plugged-in' into the structural model to estimate the relevant parameters. Implementations for static games have been proposed by Aguirregabiria (2004) and Bajari et al. (2006) and have been applied by Ellickson and Misra (2008) among others. The pseudo-likelihood approach gives consistent estimates of the structural parameters without having to solve the game, search for the various equilibria or implement a selection rule. Unfortunately, if the researcher wishes to engage in any policy experiments she is left with no option but to revisit the problem of solving the game. Further, these pseudo-liklihood apraoches require large amounts of data and admitting unobservables into the framework is di¢ cult.
Finally, there is the recent approach advocated by Judd and Su (2008) that uses a direct and exhaustive search over the parameters and equilibria space. The authors term their approach Mathematical Programming with Economic Constraints (MPEC) and argue for a constrained optimization approach to estimation. The recipe is fairly straightforward and entails maximizing the likelihood subject to the equilibrium constraints. In essence, the equilibrium probabilities are treated as parameters to be estimated along with the structural parameters. The implicit selection rule employed picks from the set of possible equilibria that one which is most likely (in terms of the likelihood). Again, as with the pseudo-likelihood methods any counterfactuals or policy experiments require solving the game.
In this paper we propose an alternative Bayesian methodology that samples the parameters and equilibria jointly from the appropriate posterior. Our approach combines elements from nested …xed point and stochastic search appraoches to develop a new methodology. We propose a conditional prior over the unobserved equilibrium probabilities which facilitates sampling. This then allows us to construct an MCMC routine that stochastically explores the posterior while restraining its attention only to the set of points in the posterior that are consistent with the equilibria of the game. Our porposed algorithm uses a Di¤erential Evolution based proposal step that explores the posterior surface e¢ ciently without becoming 'stuck'in any given area. The method is particularly appealing because it solves the game as de…ned by the researcher at each iteration. In other words the likelihood is precisely de…ned, requires no approximations or …rst step estimators. Further, because of the fact that we are using a Bayesian approach, all inference is exact. Consequently, no expensive postestimation bootstraps or asymptotic arguments are needed to compute 'con…dence' intervals. The MCMC routine, provides the researcher with the posterior density of the parameters and chosen equilibria. Finally, the approach also facilitates naturally the implementation of counterfactuals and policy experiments. Given a particular set of parameters a modi…ed sampler can be run that only samples the equilibrium probabilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We …rst discuss the context of our paper by shocasing the multiplicity problem. In the next section we present our proposed algorithm and provide a discussion of how and why it works with examples. Following that, use our sampler in the context of two 'real' research problems and conclude with a discussion of directions for future research.
The Setup: Static Discrete Games
In what follows, players are indexed by i and take actions a i 2 f0; 1; :::; Kg with a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ) denoting the collection of actions across all n players. The state vector for player i is denoted s i and s = (s 1 ; :::; s n ) denotes the set of states across players. We will assume that the utility player i derives from choosing a given action a i (= k) is additively separable in the private information component " i (k) and can be written u (a; s;
If we assume that F (") is the Extreme Value density and is i.i.d. across players and actions the probability of choosing action k can be denoted by the set of …xed point equations,
where v k (p e ; s i ; ) = E "(a i ) [ṽ k (a; s i ; ) js] : Any vector of choice probabilities across players p e 2 P is called an equilibrium if, for a given state vector s 2 S and for parameter vector 2 ; it satis…es the above …xed point equations for all players i = 1::N . 3 We then say that fp e ; ; sg 2 P S is an equilibrium point and set of equilibrium points denoted by P e P S is termed the equilibrium manifold (Balasko 1988).
As with most static games of incomplete information, we make a number of standard assumptions. First, we assume that the " are private information and i.i.d. across players and actions. In this paper we also assume both the " and the actions of competitors (a i ) enter a player's payo¤ function (u i ) in an additive-separable manner. The assumption of i.i.d. errors is a fundamental aspect of the informational 3 The probability space P is the product of N K unit cubes and is de…ned as P = N Q i=1 assumption of private information. The assumption that the " are independent across actions is for convenience and a more general setup could allow for correlations. Further, as mentioned before, for purposes of convenience we will assume that the " follow an Extreme Value distribution. Finally, players are assumed to move simultaneously given their beliefs. Given these assumptions on the primitives of the game each set of equilibrium probabilities characterize a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game.
An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the context and the nuances of the issues we deal with we start with a simple example. Consider a stylized coordination game with two players (i = A or B) each of whom can pick one of two possible actions (k = 1 or 2). Let the payo¤s be de…ned asũ
Recall that the " are private information so players make have to make decisions based on expected payo¤s
Expected payo¤s for player B can be constructed analogously. Assuming Extreme Value (Type I) error gives us the familiar Logit form and equilibrium probabilities are then described by,
With P A2 = 1 P A1 and P B2 = 1 P B1 : Since both sides of the above equations are con…ned to lie between 0 and 1; we know from Brouwer's …xed point theorem that an equilibrium exists. That is, the equations will have at least one point of intersection. However, there is no guarantee that this will be the only point of intersection and consequently we may be faced with the possibility of multiple equilibria. For example assume that s A = s B = 1; 0 = 2; 1 = 1 and = 6. The reaction curves of the two players are shown in panel (a) of Figure (1) :These particular parameters generate three possible equilibria, e 1 : fP A1 = 0:9293; P B1 = 0:9293g e 2 : fP A1 = 0:5000; P B1 = 0:5000g e 3 : fP A1 = 0:0707; P B1 = 0:0707g There are depicted by the points of intersection of the reaction curves. Two of these equilibria (e 1 ; e 3 ) are stable (red dots) while e 2 is not. That is, a best response approach starting even in close proximity to e 2 would move away from it. In general, multiplicity can occur in a number of situations and for a variety of parameters. The second panel (Figure 1(b) ) plots for the set of equilibria for games where the strategic interaction parameter 2 [2; 10]: The three equilibria corresponding to our example lie on the vertical line with = 6: In this setting, for the assumed values of s and , multiple equilibria exist for the range 2 [5:4641; 8:4644]: Outside this range there is a unique equilibrium in the game. Keep in mind that this plot simply depicts a slice of the equilibrium manifold since we are only allowing to vary. The nature of the reaction functions and the resultant set of equilibria will change as the value of the parameters and state variables change.
Figures (2) and (3) show some example of reaction curves and equilibria for the game described above but with di¤erent values for s, and :The slopes of the reaction functions are governed by the strategic interaction parameter : The …rst set of plots ( Figure 2 ) have positive strategic interaction parameters (i.e. > 0) while the second set ( Figure 3 ) have the opposite ( < 0) : Further, in most cases increases in absolute value from left to right.
The prevalence of multiplicity and the corresponding manifold it generates creates problems for estimation. The researcher does not know the following:
(i) the true value of the parameters, (ii) if there are multiple equilibria at the true parameter values and (iii) If there happen to be multiple equilibria which particular subset of equilibria were "played"to generate the observed choice data.
A complete econometric model requires the explicit addressing of all three of these issues. Most empirical work (see e.g. Bajari et al. 2010; Sweeting 2009 ) assumes (as we do) that there is a single equilibrium played in any given market. This helps alleviate problems related to the third point, albeit not completely. It simply assumes away the possibility that there might be any sort of mixing or randomization over equilibria within a market. Addressing second issue in a comprehensive manner involves the complete characterization of the equilibrium manifold. This is a di¢ cult task and while there are ongoing attempts we know of no established approach that accomplishes this task. In our estimation approach we will work around this problem by exploring the equilibrium manifold using MCMC methods. This approach will ultimately allow us to obtain estimates of the true parameters as well.
MCMC for Discrete Games

Constructing the Posterior
In order to set up the posterior we need to introduce notation related to data. We will assume that the researcher has data across M independent markets. De…ne 
Adding priors ( ) and # (#) allows us to write down the posterior for and #
Alternatively, we could work with the joint posterior of ; # and P e = fp ( ;#; P e jy; s)
Note that while the equilibrium set P e m ( ) is a deterministic function of the parameters and state variables the chosen equilibrium (p e m ) is not. Rather, it is chosen from the set based on some mechaansim. Since this mechanism is unobserved, the researcher needs to specify a distribution that stochastically picks an equilibrium from P e m ( ) and captures the associated uncertainty. Consequently, we can interpret p (p e m ; #; P e m ( )) as a 'prior'(or a mixing distribution) instead of as an equilibrium selection rule. In the Bayesian paradigm these distinctions are in any case irrelevant and result in the same estimator. The semantic change does, however, facilitate the construction of the MCMC routine in what follows. We note here that the prior is over which equilibrium gets played not how it was arrived at since that is completely determined by the structure of the game. The reader might …nd it odd that the 'prior' conditions on other parameters ( ) : This is perfectly …ne from a theoretical perspective since we can always de…ne
as a joint prior. Also note that the fact that the equilibria are a function of the state variables and consequently enter the prior is also not a problem as long as s is strictly exogenous. Note that for now we are working with the assumption that the researcher has the ability to specify p (p e m ; #; P e m ( )) precisely, which as we have already noted may be infeasible. We will discuss relaxing this requirement later.
MCMC along the Equilibrium Manifold
If we assume that p (p e m ; #; P e m ) can be explicitly evaluated then the construction of an MCMC routine that samples from the appropriate posterior is straightforward. The key here is to recognize that the equilibrium probabilities are conditioned on and # and we cannot separate them. The idea, rather, is to sample ; # and p e in tandem. One example of such an algorithm is presented below.
Algorithm 1 -Basic Metropolis-Hastings
At iteration t + 1
Parameter
Step:
Draw # 0 from the candidate density q # #j# (t)
Manifold
Step
Metropolis-Hastings Accept-Reject
Jointly accept the vector
o with probability;
and update
Algorithm 1 outlines a basic Metropolis-Hastings routine that samples parameters and equilibrium probabilities together. There are three key steps in the routine. First, we draw a candidate parameter vectors 0 and # 0 from some proposal densities q j (t) and q # #j# (t) : In the next step, we condition on these values and draw a candidate equilibrium vector from the proposal density q p p e m jp (t) m in each market. Finally, we accept these candidates with probability M H :
There are two major problems with this routine: First, it requires us to write down an analytical expression for the complete posterior, which may be unavailable. In other words, unless the researcher has the ability to characterize the equilibrium manifold Algorithm 1 is infeasible. The second problem is that, even if we could evaluate the posterior the MCMC routine described above would mix very slowly. To see this note that unless the proposal q p p e m jp (t) m places mass only on the equilibrium manifold the posterior will be zero and the chain will not move. We thus need a proposal that enforces the structure of the game. One possibility is to set q p = Jointly accept the vector
In Algorithm 2, each p e mi is an equilibrium probability drawn from the set P Recall that the task at hand is the construction of a prior that reasonably re ‡ects the a priori beliefs of the researcher about the equilibrium that would be picked. We …rst note that the prior for p e m in most cases will be of the following form,
whereP e m P e m ( ) and P e m ( ) is a set of all possible equilibrium points supported by ( ; s m ) : There are various reasons why this particular speci…cation will be needed. In almost any empirical application the researcher will need to place restrictions on the type of equilibria being considered. For example, one may place positive mass only on those equilibria that are consistent with some other pre-speci…ed rule such as best-response stability (e.g. Sweeting (2009) 
In the above speci…cation are a set of functions chosen by the researcher and # are parameters to be estimated. For example, in an entry game we could specify To be clear, we are not specifying a rule for how the equilibrium was generated. That aspect is completely governed by the primitive assumpptions placed on the structure of the game. Unlike complete information games we cannot use alternative structures as equilibrium selection rules. For example, a Berry (1992) type rule that imposes sequence of moves based on some criterio (e.g. …rms with higher pro…ts move …rst) will generate equilibria that are inconsistent with those in a simultaneous move game. This is because unlike complete information games the equilibria is depicted by probabilities not actions. In a sense we are simply imposing a prior on which of the equilibria generated by the game was played in the data generating process. The rule should be seen as agnostic about the process by which the equilibrium was selected and serves only as an approximation. As Sweeting (2009) points out this speci…cation can be thought of as a randomization device or as the proportion of markets playing the particular equilibrium pro…le. From the point of view of the researcher, it simply re ‡ects the prior belief that a particular equilibrium is played in the data.
Evaluating p e m j#;P m explicitly is possible only if we could enumerateP m : To our knowledge there is no currently established algorithm that accomplishes this objective. 4 Having said that, there are indeed applications where this might be feasible and if so the likelihood can be directly evaluated. For example, Sweeting (2009) starts his search from the extreme vertices of the N K unit cube and uses a best response iteration to …nd all equilibria. He shows that this approach …nds all the equilibria in his game. Our objective is to propose a method that works in the more general case there such enumeration may not be possible. Below we show that we can sample from (11) even though we cannot evaluate it. are non-overlapping and every point in P must be in the domain of attraction of some …xed point. Our assumption implicitly imposes a particular speci…cation on P e m jP e m ( ) where we place mass only on best-response stable equilibria. 5 Second our speci…cation is chosen to facilitate sampling from the equilibrium manifold without fully characterizing it. We document this sampling approach in Algorithm 3.
Sampling from
Algorithm 3 -Sampling from the Prior
In the above routine, I # 0 is an indicator vector with ones where the subscripted condition is satis…ed and zero otherwise, denotes the Hadamard (element-by-element) product and and denote the basis vectors with the minimal and maximal values of the elements. Finally, is the best response operator de…ned earlier (i.e. the collection of choice probabilities denoted by equation (2)). 6 An explanation of the algorithm is in order. First we note that
5 This is not required. We could just as easily alter the de…nition of D (p e m ) to be the Newtonian basin of attraction and use Newton's root solving method to generate candidate equilibria. As long as every equilibria can be generated with positive probability our MCMC routine will converge. 6 One may opt to use other more e¢ cient iterative methods to speed up convergence here. In our applications we use Mann iterations which seem to work well. Regular Piacrd iterations also gave essentially identical results but in some cases took a long time to converge. The reader is refered to the excellent book by Berinde (2007) for a review of Mann, Picard and other …xed point iteration methods and their properties.
So we simply need to draw equilibria proportional to the weights described by the RHS of the above equation. The algorithm essentially proceeds as follows: First it samples a candidate equilibrium fromP m ( ) with probabilities proportional to D (p e m ). By de…nition, starting from a random point on the N m K unit cube and iterating using a best-response type iteration will generate a candidate equilibria with probability proportional to its domain of attraction. Once a candidate is available the algorithm uses an accept-reject rule to obtain a draw.
To implement the accept-reject step we have to construct an envelope probability for exp ( 
simply implements this more generally. Once we have V m a simple accept-reject rule obtains the draw. The rationale behind the last bit is that rejection sampling from a multinomial distribution does not require the probabilities but only the relative weights. As long as we can envelope these weights then by drawing a given index (in our case an equilibrium) and then using the accept-reject rule as prescribed provides accurate draws. 7 A special case of our speci…cation is when # = 0: In this case the algorithm integrates over the equilibria according to their domains of attractions. In general, identifying parameters related to the equilibrium selection is a di¢ cult task and using this simpli…ed speci…cation might be a useful strategy. We will discuss this in a later section.
Informativeness of the chosen prior
While our proposed prior might seem somewhat arbitrary, it is not completely unreasonable. Clearly we would prefer a uniform prior over equilibria since it is as close to uninformative as we could be. However, such a prior is infeasible in general since it requires knowledge of the number of equilibria or requires the sampler to …nd all equilibria at each iteration. To ascertain the degree to which our choice of prior in ‡uences our inferences we present a simple but stylized example. Consider a case with asymmetric …rms = ( 3; 1; 6) and x = ( 1:75; 2) with payo¤s and game-structure described in section 2.1. In this game there are two stable equilibria 7 Suppose we wanted to draw from a multinomial with probability = : All we would need are weights (say w = (50; 25; 25)) that are proportional to and the knowledge that the maximum weight is bounded above by some value (say V = 100):Then by drawing an index uniformly (j) and accepting the draw only if w j > U 0; V we will get draws exactly proportional to the requisite probabilities. In our case the indices are the equilibria that are generated non-uniformly (based on their domain of attraction). An R version of this algorithm for multinomial draws is available from the author upon request. f(0:0687; 0:3571) ; (0:7442; 0:9697)g : We will assume that # = 0 so that the domains of attraction e¤ectively impose a "prior" with weights (0:5835; 0:4165) on the two equilibria. We assume that we have a single market. The table below depicts the posterior weights on each equilibria conditional on the single observation.
Posterior Weights Observation Equilibrium #1 Clearly, even with a single observation, the data on actions chosen are informative about the equilibrium picked. Given a choice the algorithm will tend to pick those equilibria that are most consistent with the data observed. So, if we see a = (0; 0) the posterior weights tend to weigh quite heavily on equilibrium #1 and similarly a = (1; 1) tends to favor equilibrium #2. Consider a more extreme case where our prior happens to place a measly 10% weight on the high equilibrium and the data happen to be a = (1; 1). Even in this extreme case the posterior probability of the high equilibrium being chosen turns out to be around 0:77: Further reducing the prior weight to a mere 5% weight brings the posterior down to 0:61 but here again the larger weight is placed on the equilibrium #2. The main takeaway from this exercise it that the posterior weights tend to be informed primarily by the data. Of course, if the prior has the additional ‡exibility of free parameters (#) then the impact of the imposed part of the prior is further reduced.
A General Di¤erential Evolution MCMC Routine
To complete our algorithm we need to adopt particular speci…cations for q and q # : Typical choices include Random-Walk speci…cations or Independence samplers with normal errors. In the context of discrete games and the nature of the posterior these approaches will be ine¢ cient since the posterior is only supported on the equilibrium manifold. In a multi-parameter setting the posterior is bound to be quite unwieldy with numerous modes and ridges, sharp turns, falls and peaks. It is well known that standard Metropolis-Hastings routines have a tendency to get "stuck" and …nd it hard to traverse "bumpy"posteriors e¢ ciently. Thus, even armed with the sampling scheme described earlier exploring the posterior in real world problems with many dimensions is di¢ cult. To deal with this we propose a perturbed Di¤erential-Evolution MCMC sampler. This algorithm is described below. 
Manifold
Metropolis-Hastings Accept-Reject Step:
There are two key improvements that this algorithm o¤er over the one proposed earlier. First, this algorithm is a population based MCMC and runs D chains in parallel. This allows for a better exploration of the posterior. Second, each chain d borrows information from other chains as the routine progresses. This interpolation happens in the parameter step where we have replaced the usual multivariate normal proposal q with a Di¤erential Evolution (DE) proposal. Di¤erential Evolution (Storn and Price 1997) is a population based algorithm where randomly chosen elements of the population "mate"to create "o¤spring"that are superior. Our approach follows Braak (2006) and perturbs the original deterministic DE proposal with a symmetric shock ( ) to ensure that the draws have unbounded support. In particular, our implementation assumes that the are distributed standard normal. The parameters ' 1 and ' 2 are both positive and are held …xed during the runs. The DE step ensures that the routine explores the posterior more e¢ ciently since the routine balances exploration and exploitation of the parameter space using information across chains. In particular, the proposal is self tuning and possesses a kind of "divergence property" (Storn and Price 1997) . When the posterior is ‡at the distances between the chains ([ d 0
d 00 ]) increase rapidly so as to explore the surface more e¢ ciently. As we get to areas where the posterior has signi…cant and dense mass the distances shrink the steps become shorter and the chains tend to coalesce. This is similar to other modi…ed MCMC methods such as the Metropolis adjusted Langevin algorithm (MALA) of Roberts and Tweedie (1996) in which proposals are generated based on
r ln (t) + and are a function of the gradient of the posterior evaluated at the current state. The idea is the step-size in the algorithm changes with r ln (t) by growing when it is large and shrinking when it is small. When the mode of the posterior is reached the gradient is zero. The DE proposals mimic this behavior, require no explicit calculation of the gradient yet provide the similar bene…ts. In the next section we discuss the properties of our proposed algorithm.
Properties of the algorithm
Our proposed algorithm is non standard and it is important that we document its properties. We show below that our basic scheme results in a reversible chain that satis…es detailed balance and results in draws from the true joint posterior. We then discuss the properties of the di¤erential evolution MCMC routine and use results in Braak (2006) to describe why each of the multiple chains has the joint posterior as its unique invariant density.
Properties of the basic MCMC scheme (Algorithm 1)
In what follows we are deliberately more general than needed and will work with Algorithm 1 (Algorithm 2 and each chain of the DE-MCMC routine are special cases.)
To begin, let q 0 ; #
o then from earlier we have,
Now (t) evolves as follows
with probability (t) ; 0 with probability 1
The Transition kernel is then de…ned as
where is Dirac's delta. This is the typical MH transition kernel augmented with the discrete distribution pertaining to the equilibria. Now, let ( jy; s) denote the stationary distribution of the posterior. For detailed balance we need to show that
Examining ( ) T ( ; 0 ) we see that it is a sum for two terms. If each satis…es detailed balance then the sum does as well. We show these in turn First note that
Similarly for the second part of the sum we have
since for any 6 = 0 we have
The equality is satis…ed trivially for = 0 : This establishes detailed balance in the general case. Since we have assumed that q (P 0 j 0 ; # 0 ) = (Pj 0 ; # 0 ) and symmetric proposals q and q # we get some simpli…cations in the acceptance ratio but all the above detailed balance equations still continue to hold. Given detailed balance, we know that the invariant density of the chain will be ( jy; s) and that the chain is reversible (Robert and Casella, Theorem 6.46, pg. 230).
To prove that the generated Markov chain is ergodic it is only necessary that we show that it is irreducible and aperiodic. To prove irreducibility we need
That is, we need to show that the candidate generating function allows the every state to be reached with positive probability from any other state. Since the posterior only has support on the equilibrium manifold as de…ned by the stable equilibria of the game, this condition implies that q should allow the state to move to any point on the equilibrium manifold (conditional on the value of s) from any other point on the manifold. Since q and q # have support on the real line and we start the algorithm which de…nes q (Pj ; #) from a uniform draw on the standard simplex this guarantees the irreducibility of the chain. To see this note that if we repeatedly drew equilibria with di¤erent starting points we would eventually …nd all stable equilibria. In other words since q and q # can move to any point f 0 ; # 0 gin the joint parameter space and we can reach any equilibrium supported by f 0 ; # 0 g with positive probability all state communicate. This is a critical aspect of the algorithm. If for example, we drew the starting points uniformly from the vertices of the simplex there would be no such guarantee since they may not collectively cover the domains of attraction of all equilibria. Finally, the chain is aperiodic since MH acceptance ratio ensures that the probability of remaining at any given state is strictly positive. Taken together, these conditions satisfy all conditions (see Robert and Casella pp. 272-274) for ergodicity. Intuitively, the algorithm works because we are moving along the equilibrium manifold in a manner that allows us to retrace our steps and move to any point on the manifold in a single step.
Properties of the DE-MCMC Algorithm
The Di¤erential evolution based routine described in Algorithm 4 possesses all the properties of a valid MCMC chain. The intuition behind this is straightforward. The DE proposals are essentially a random walk and the manifold step can be seen as part of the evaluation of the posterior. When coupled with the Metropolis-Hastings rule standard convergence properties apply. In particular, each component DE-MCMC chain has the posterior distribution of = f ; #g as its unique stationary distribution. We discuss this claim below.
The DE proposal step is symmetric since the probability of any move from
is equal to the reverse step. In other words,
This follows from the fact that the pair ( . Further, since the conditional stationary distribution does not depend on the state of the other chains the stationary distribution of the chain must also be the posterior of . In order for the stationary distribution to be unique we need to show that the MCMC chain is aperiodic and irreducible. Since, the proposal density q induced by the DE step for a particular chain d is essentially a random walk aperiodicity is almost surely guaranteed. Finally, the unbounded support of and that is a proper density implies that all q > 0. It follows then that every set within the support of that has positive measure can be reached in a single step, ensuring that the chain is irreducible. Since the chain is aperiodic, irreducible and satis…es detailed balance with respect it must have as its unique stationary distribution. Coupled with the discussion earlier we can claim that the draws obtained from our proposed sampler will be from the joint posterior of interest. In what follows we illustrate the implementation of our algorithm with example and real applications.
Illustrating the Algorithm 3.5.1 Example 1: How the Algorithm works
To illustrate the working of the algorithm we use the simple static discrete game with two players and two actions described in section 2.1. The probability of player i choosing action a i = 1 is denoted by,
For the purposes of our example we will let 0 = 3 and = 6: Note that this is exactly equivlent to the setting in the example disccused in section 2.1. As before, for these parameter values there exist three possible symmetric equilibria at f0:0707; 0:5; 0:9293g : Of these the equilibrium at 0:5 is unstable. Next, we generate 10,000 data points from the high equilibrium [P 1 = P 2 = 0:9293] :The data generated is presented in the table below
62 689 a 2 = 1 668 8581
:
For now assume that 0 = 3 is known and the researcher only wishes to estimate (and of course infer p e ). Note that because the game is symmetric and there exist no covariates, the likelihood depends on a single equilibrium probability. Based on this, we can map out the the likelihood which is supported on the equilibrium manifold. Note that there is no mass in any area but on the ribbon that de…nes the manifold. The aim of the algorithm described earlier is to trace out this manifold accepting points on it that stochastically enhance the posterior. To understand how the approach works consider panel (a) in Figure (5 ) :We start with a randomly chosen starting point in the parameter-probability space denoted by the grey diamond. The manifold step then uses best-response iterates to …nd the closest …xed point located on the manifold (denoted by the hollow circle). In this case, obviously, the draw is accepted since there is positive mass at this point. The next iteration then begins with a new candidate for the parameter and a new starting point for % 0 (grey solid circle). Again the Manifold step iterates to …nd the closest …xed point which is also accepted. This goes on with some points being accepted and others rejected (dark cross) until the algorithm is interrupted by the researcher. The results from one run of this algorithm are presented in panel (b) of Figure (2) .
The red (gray) dots indicate accepted draws while the black dots are rejected draws. The plot depicts a fairly dense posterior for 1 with a mean of 6:01: The MCMC routine also …nds the appropriate equilibria with a high degree of precision with a mean of 0:93. The dashed lines o¤er a 95% highest posterior density region. While the example described above is elementary, it serves to illustrate the basic ideas behind our routine.
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Example 2: A more involved example
We now examine a more realistic example modeled after Sweeting (2009) :In this model players play a coordination game such that payo¤s are
with player B's payo¤s de…ned analogously. The equilibrium probabilities are then implicitly de…ned by
We will assume that 0 = 0:25; 1 = 1 and = 3: These parameters will often generate multiple equilibria with at most two stable equilibria. In the case when this happens we will assume that equilibria are picked based on the following rule p e m j#;P m = exp P
(1)
(27) with = 2:Thus, equilibria that favor both players picking action 1 are more likely to be accepted. Note that the data generating mechanism …nds all stable equilibria using Sweeting's approach of starting from the vertices of the unit cube and then chooses one based on the rule described above. That is, the domain of attraction weights are not used in the DGP. We generate data for M = 5000 markets with s Am and s Bm drawn from standard densities. The generated equilibria are depicted in Figure (6 ) : Of these markets 397 markets had multiple (exactly 2) equilibria while the rest had a single stable equilibria. As the plots show, in the case of multiple equilibria the odds of picking the equilibrium with larger probabilities are substantially higher. The choices generated from these equilibria are described below.
We used the Di¤erential Evolution MCMC routine with D = 15 chains, each with randomly chosen starting values. We ran the sampler for 15; 000 iterations and retained the last 5000 for inference. The sampler converged quite quickly and draws from the converged chains seemed to locate all parameters quite accurately. The 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD) regions are reported in Table ( Overall, we believe our sampler performed quite well with limited data. The results on recovering are especially encouraging but should be taken with a word of caution. Our particular example generated a large number of markets with multiple equilibria and the variation in the covariates was limited. E¤ectively the data o¤ers a reasonable number of replications of the game. This is critical to identifying : In real applications where we have only cross-sectional data such identi…cation may be infeasible. We discuss this in the next section.
Identi…cation
We do not aim to provide a formal discussion of identi…cation here since these have been discussed before. We refer the reader to Sweeting Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) for excellent discussions on the topic. In this section we will summarize the identi…cation results from the literature and informally discuss the assumptions and data requirements for the identi…cation of the models discussed in this paper. We will …rst discuss parameter identi…cation assuming that the equilibrium probabilities (Conditional Choice Probabilities or CCPs) are known. We will then discuss the identi…cation of the CCPs themselves.
Parameter Identi…cation given Equilibrium Probabilities
Assuming that the CCP's are known identi…cation of the parameters involves showing that these probabilities can be inverted to identify the parameter. There are two cases worth discussing here (i) When players are identical and (ii) When players are heterogeneous. If players are identical and at least two equilibria are played in the data then the parameters of the model are identi…ed. To see this consider example 1. In this setup if only a single equilibrium is played in the data then 0 and cannot be separately identi…ed since there will be an in…nite number of curves that can pass though the equilibrium point. In this case one would need to normalize 0 or, as in our example, assume it is known, in order to identify : If on the other hand two equilibria are played in the data then we can pinpoint the (logit) curve that passes through these points and identify both 0 and . Sweeting (2009) discusses this identi…cation in more formal detail.
When players exhibit observed heterogeneity, as in our applications, identi…cation is achieved on account of excluded variation. This idea is discussed in some detail in Bajari et al. (2010) as well as in other papers. The basic idea is that if there exists at least one covariate that impacts the payo¤s of each player but that does not directly in ‡uence those of other players (except via their actions) then the parameters are identi…ed. In this case the CCPs of other players exhibit variation that is independent of the state variables of any given player. This variation helps nail down the strategic parameter and the rest of the parameters are identi…ed from the variation in the remaining state variables. In empirical applications using the methods presented here we strongly encourage the use of such exclusions.
Identi…cation of Equilibrium Probabilities
Under the assumption that a single equilibrium is played in the entire data the identi…cation of the equilibrium probabilities (CCPs) is trivial. Since we observe the state variables and the actions the reduced form probabilities are estimable. With enough (in…nite) data these probabilities can be identi…ed exactly. The more interesting case is when we assume that a single equilibrium is played in each market. In this case again, as long as we have panel data with enough repetitions the CCPs are identi…ed. With cross-sectional data the identi…cation argument relies inability of a common model to adequately rationalize the variation in the choices. Sweeting (2009) shows that the identi…cation of the equilibrium probabilities and associated equilibrium selection parameters (in our case #) with symmetric players boils down to examining the conditions for the identi…cation of a …nite mixture model with cross-sectional data. The case where the players (and equilibria) are not symmetric on account of observed chracteristics is less transparent but identi…cation is still acheived as long as there is su¢ cient variation in types relative to the number of equilibria. Our own experience (with a large number of Monte-Carlo experiments) is that as long as enough markets exhibit multiplicity and the excluded state variables vary su¢ cienttly the equilibrium probability and the selection parameters seem identi…ed. The fact that unlike complete information games the number of equilibria do not increase signi…cantly with the number of players or actions (Bajari et al. 2011 ).
Finally, we would like to discuss the issue of heterogeneity and common unobservables. There is clearly a confound between identifying heterogeneity and multiple equilibria with cross-sectional data. Since the variation required to obtain the CCPs with multiple equilibria is essentially the same that would identify heterogeneity identi…cation is questionable. Again if we had panel data with enough replications of the game, identi…cation would not be a concern. Alternatively, if we gave up on identifying # (as we do in our discount store application) then the same variation can be used to parametrically identify unobserved heterogeneity across markets.
Implementation
Application: Supermarket Pricing Strategy
To test the feasibility of our proposed MCMC approach we apply our algorithm to a reasonably sized, real data based research question. The application we consider is the decision of supermarkets to choose everyday low pricing (EDLP) strategies. We focus our attention on 852 markets where there are only two stores. 9 The model can be simply summarized by the following probability of player i choosing EDLP in market m,
Where
Store Size Proportion of Minorities in Population
Vertical Integration Dummy,
We extend Ellickson and Misra (2008) by allowing key parameter of interest ; which measures the impact competitive strategy choices have on the focal player's payo¤s, to vary across markets. In particular, we let
Finally, as in the earlier example we used a prior speci…cation where p e m j#;P m = exp P
1m (EDLP ) + P
2m (EDLP ) exp P
2m (EDLP ) + exp P
2m (EDLP ) (30) We have restricted our attention to a small set of variables to model this choice. We note that the store size and vertical integration dummies act as exclusion variables that identify the model. Ellickson and Misra (2008) …nd that > 0; albeit with a larger dataset and more variables. The 2-player markets are fairly well spread out over the continental US and are plotted in Figure 7 .
Details
We set up our MCMC routine with D = 20. That is, we use 20 chains that will communicate with each other. The MCMC chain was run for 15,000 iterations and the last 5000 were retained for inference. The initial values for the routine were chosen at random rather than possibly more informative values. 10 We allowed for a maximum of one thousand best response iterates in the manifold step although no more than 200 were ever used. The chain converged quite quickly for the scale of the problem and in no case did the best-response iteration fail to converge. The acceptance rate was about 14% 11 on average with chain speci…c acceptance rates ranging from 6.7% to 63.3%. The chains did have some autocorrelation and we thinned the chain by subsampling. A casual observation of trace plots showed that the pooled chain has converged. 12 
Results
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 2 . For comparison purposes we also estimated the model using a 2-step approach and …nd that both methods recover 10 For example, a simple two step estimator might o¤er reasonable starting values. 11 As a frame of reference, a traditional MH routine resulted in a <2% acceptance rate after 200,000 iterations. 12 Standard convergence diagnostices such as R-statistic of Gelman et al. (2004) qualitatively similar parameters. The di¤erences may be on account of a number of di¤erences between the estimators and we will no speculate here.
While this is a fairly limited analysis of the problem, the results accord well with those obtained by Ellickson and Misra (2008) who used pseudo-likelihood methods. The strategic e¤ect, while still positive, is lower in our results. The range evaluated at the posterior means of 0 and 1 across markets was (0:7984; 3:08). At the converged draws multiplicity existed only in a few markets (between 4 and 11) and it is not altogether surprising that the parameter is e¤ectively not identi…ed and re ‡ects only the information in the prior. Changing the equilibrium selection rule did not alter the qualitative …ndings and we do not report those results here.
Equilibrium Probabilities
As a by product of the estimation routine the MCMC also provides a natural way to construct posterior estimates of the equilibrium probabilities. Since the equilibrium probabilities are a function of the state variables and the parameters, the draws of the parameters coupled with the manifold step allows us to …nd the density of equilibrium probabilities in any market. In Figure (8) we present examples of the di¤erent equilibria estimated in our application. We note that most of the markets were of the type depicted in the top left panel (Market #11).
In the …gure each line corresponds to the best response curve conditioned on the state variables and a draw from the posterior of : These MCMC draws allow us to construct con…dence sets for equilibrium probabilities For example, the top left hand panel shows a market where the equilibrium probabilities for both players range within [0:13; 0:25] with the mean around f0:174; 0:189g : The equilibrium is not symmetric as player two always has a higher probability.
In some cases since the state variables are identical, the equilibrium turns out to be symmetric and lies on the 45 o line. In other cases, the equilibrium probabilities are asymmetric. Further we also see that in some cases the probabilities are a more dispersed than in others. Again, this happens because the state variables in some markets di¤er signi…cantly across players. We note here that, the draws for the parameters are held the same across markets. The di¤erences arise only on account of the state variables and the strategic interaction parameter. The fact that our algorithm traces multiple equilibria is evident in the two plots with multiple intersections of the reaction functions. In one case (Market #316) the algorithm sampled both equilibria relatively frequently but only accepted the lower equilibrium once in the set of draws we considered. This market had both players adopting EDLP when the state variables could have easily justi…ed PROMO. The strategic interaction parameter for this market was among the highest and this essentially generated multiple equilibria.
Overall, the DE-MCMC algorithm works fairly e¢ ciently and without much supervision. As we mentioned earlier for the 2-store markets the chain converged in less than three hours. The routine can also be used as an equilibrium sampling routines based on parameters estimated from 2-step/NPL approaches. There are a number of other extensions worth considering, we discuss some of these in what follows.
Heterogeneity and Common Unobservables
Unlike Pseudo-likelihood approaches the MCMC methods used in this paper do not have to construct beliefs since the routine relies on a nested …xed point approach. As such, incorporating additional unobservable (to the researcher) components is not a problem since we do not have to worry about the consistency of the …rst step estimators. For example, market heterogeneity (say m ) that accounts for common unobservables can also be added without major modi…cations.
The basic idea would be to construct a hierarchical speci…cation,
and then draw m for each market (conditioned on a candidate ) and search the equilibrium manifold to construct the posterior. Note that care must be taken to ensure that is updated only if the m it spawns moves the MCMC chain. Even with this, the increase in complexity is limited since the manifold search section remains the same. Player heterogeneity ( i ) can be handled similarly but requires that we observe the same player operating in multiple markets (e.g. same chains across markets), i.e. that we have panel data.
Application: Discount Store Entry
To illustrate how unobservables can be accommodated into the proposed MCMC approach we use a "real world"example: an entry game between WalMart and Kmart discount stores. We will assume that there are only two players 13 Kmart and WalMart 13 During the time period of this data Target was not a major player.
who compete across a number of small local markets. We will further assume that their entry patterns can be modeled as a static discrete game. The dataset we use is drawn from Jia (2008) and was constructed by the author for her analysis of the discount retail industry. Our model is a simpli…ed version of her framework, and assumes that the two chains make independent entry decisions across a collection of local markets. As in Jia (2008) we only use markets in which each …rm operates at most one store. A local market is de…ned to be a county which gives us 2,065 relatively small and isolated markets which are assumed to be independent replications of the discrete game where the two …rms decide whether to "enter" or not. In keeping with the assumptions outlined earlier the game will be assumed to be one of incomplete information where …rms make simultaneous moves.
Speci…cation
We keep the speci…cation of the latent pro…ts simple and include key covariates identi…ed by Jia (2008) in the model. The probability of any …rm i 2 fW alM art; Kmartg entering market m is denoted by,
(32) In the above = f ; ; g and the observable components X and Z i contain common and player speci…c covariates respectively. These are describe below. In addition, the model the proposed model contains a market level random e¤ect m which is assumed to be Normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 : The role of the common unobservable is important in uncovering the true strategic e¤ect since ignoring such market level e¤ects could exaggerate the strategic interaction e¤ect. At the same time, incorporating such unobservables into discrete games is nontrivial since we have to solve for the equilibrium probabilities. Using the notation de…ned earlier, with the action space a = fEN T ER; N OT EN T ERg we can write the likelihood for a given market as, (34) In this application we do not specify an equilibrium selection rule and simply draw equilibria proportional to their domains of attraction. As we discussed earlier, with cross-sectional data identifying both heterogeneity and the selection rule parameters is untenable. What further exacerbates the problem is that in this application, there doesn't seem to be signi…cant evidence of multiplicity which render any identi…cation of equilibrium selection moot.
Implementation Details
A quick look at the likelihood makes it clear why the estimating discrete games in the presence of unobservables is computationally demanding. The key problem arises on account of the common unobservables which need to be integrated out. This is non-trivial since the equilibrium probabilities are conditioned on the value of m : For example, a Monte-Carlo approach would involve drawing m for each market and solving for the …xed point for each draw. At …rst glance this problem prohibit the use of the MCMC approach since we have to jointly accept (or reject) the parameters and equilibrium probabilities. This would entail jointly accepting/rejecting hundreds if not thousands of parameters. Fortunately, we can block parameters into two sets and run the modi…ed routine for each set. That is, we construct two blocks and f m g and apply the proposed DE-MCMC routine to each block sequentially by conditioning on the other block.
To be more speci…c, given draws of the parameter vector we sample f ; Pg jointly using the DE-MCMC routine. We then take the draws of as given and sample f ; Pg. This increases the computational burden since the algorithm requires us to …nd the equilibrium manifold twice for each market (at each draw) once for the common parameters and once for the market speci…c e¤ects. This increase however turns out not to be prohibitive from an implementation point of view. In the current application M = 2065 and the algorithm converges in less than a couple of hours. Note also, that this blocking strategy does not alter the properties of the MCMC chain since we are always sampling equilibria every time a new parameter set is proposed. More generally, any Gibbs-type algorithm for each individual parameter would also be acceptable (albeit computationally expensive) as long as "new" candidate equilibria were also being generated at the same time. Essentially, all such algorithms that explore the manifold by sampling parameters and equilibria together will work. We used D = 50 communicating chains for this application, ran the MCMC chain was run for 25,000 iterations and retained the last 5000 for inference. We allowed for a maximum of one thousand best-response iterates in the manifold step although no more than 200 were ever used. The chain converged quite quickly (less than 2 hours) and in no case did the best-response iteration fail to converge. The converged chain had an acceptance rate of about 21% for the base parameters and m was accepted on average in 45% of the markets at any given draw. As with the pricing case study some autocorrelation was found and we thinned the chain by subsampling. For the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition trace plots and other convergence details are not presented here but are available from the author upon request.
Results
The results from the MCMC run are presented in Table ( 3) : For the sake of comparison we have also included results from a MCMC run of a baseline model that ignores market level heterogeneity. The direction and magnitude of the e¤ects in the base model are comparable to those presented in Jia (2008) and in who use the same data. The comparison to is noteworthy since they use the same speci…cation as us but di¤erent estimation approaches and obtain essentially similar results. Our numerical results are slightly di¤erent since the posterior means does not coincide with parameters describing the Likelihood mode.
The estimates provide signi…cant evidence for market level heterogeneity. The pos-terior mean for the standard deviation parameter ( ) of the market e¤ect density was found to be 0:90 with a 95% HPD (Highest Posterior Density) region of (0:78; 1:03) : Figure (9) shows the density plot of the posterior means of of the heterogeneity elements ( m ) across the 2065 markets in the data. A marginal likelihood comparison across the models also provides "strong evidence" for heterogeneity. Apart from the heterogeneity constructs exhibiting strong statistical signi…cance they also a¤ord some substantially meaningful insights. The inclusion of market e¤ects eliminates the role played by region (MidWest and South) dummies. This is not altogether surprising since local market e¤ects are a more powerful explanatory mechanism for local decisions. A more important …nding is that the inclusion of this source of heterogeneity signi…cantly reduces (but does not eliminate) the strategic interaction e¤ect. This is similar to the …ndings in Orhun (2010) . Since this exercise was simply to document the feasibility of the method we will not belabor a more detailed discussion of the results but will conclude this discussion by stating our belief that the MCMC procedures outlined in this paper can be used for most discrete games of incomplete information games without much computational cost.
Concluding Remarks
While this paper has focused on static discrete games, the methods presented here are fairly general and could be applied to other contexts as well with appropriate modi…cations.
In a number of cases the researcher may have access to additional data that arises as a consequence of the decisions made by the players. For example, in Ellickson and Misra (2008) the authors have access to revenue data that is conditioned on the choice of a supermarkets pricing strategy choice. The authors present a semiparametric approach to correcting for selectivity in the revenue regression in the context of a …rst stage discrete game among many players. While their approach is agnostic about the distribution of the structural errors a more parametric approach could be used to construct an appropriate joint likelihood for the observed data and then used in our proposed MCMC scheme.
Our attention in this paper has been limited to simultaneous move games of incomplete information. The method could easily be modi…ed to apply to games with sequential moves or games with a sequence of simultaneously moving sets of players (say incumbents then entrants). Such a speci…cation was used by Jia (2008) in her analysis of discount store entry. Of course, a pure sequential move game o¤ers the additional simpli…cation of uniqueness which reduces the computational burden signi…cantly. There may be contexts, however, where the order of the moves is unknown. In such a case the methods presented in this paper could easily be modi…ed to estimate the model by drawing a random permutation for the order of play at each iteration. An application of this type and the conditions for the identi…cation of the order of play are presented in Einav (2010) in the context of movie release timing.
The implementation of Bayesian methods (in particular MCMC methods) to the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models is a new and exciting area of research. To our knowledge there is no published work on the use of these methods in the context of dynamic games. The problem with adopting a MCMC approach stems from the fact that a dynamic game involves the solution to a coupled …xed point problem. That is, the researcher has to solve for the …xed point in value function space as well as for the equilibrium in the players action space. Even with the e¢ ciency "tricks"presented here this poses a computationally challenging problem.
Having said that, there may be particular cases where a MCMC approach may be viable. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) propose alternative probability based characterizations of optimal policy function in the context of single and multi-agent decision makers. In some very special cases (e.g. terminal states, …nite dependence, discrete state spaces) rather startling simpli…cations emerge which could be exploited to obtain computational gains. One example is the work by Ellickson, Misra and Nair (2011) who show how a dynamic game of pricing strategy choice can be estimated using simple methods by exploiting the terminal nature of the exit decision. Combining these clever recharacterizations of the value function space with the methods proposed in this paper might o¤er a promising avenue for future research.
In summary, this paper outlines a simple approach to sampling parameters from a likelihood supported on the equilibrium manifold of a discrete game. The application demonstrates the viability and validity of the approach in a simple setting by applying the proposed methods to two research datasets. The basic ideas are general, and can be applied to other settings fairly straightforwardly. We hope that this research spurs interest in the estimation of discrete games using MCMC methods.
